Abstract-We consider a scenario with multiple independent microgrids close to each other in a region that are connected to each other and to the central grid (macrogrid). In each time slot, a given microgrid may produce more than, less than or as much power as it needs, and there is uncertainty on which of these events may occur. The microgrids with excess power, those with deficit power and the macrogrid trade power in an electricity market, in which each microgrid with excess power quotes a price for it and the microgrids with deficit power buy power from the microgrids who quote the lowest prices. This results in price competition among the microgrids with excess power, and this competition has several distinguishing features not normally present in price competition in traditional markets studied in economics. We analyze this price competition using the framework of game theory, explicitly compute a Nash Equilibrium and show its uniqueness.
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditional power systems often generate power in large power stations using fossil fuel resources, and distribute it over long distances. This results in depletion of fossil fuel resources, environmental pollution and large energy losses during distribution [4] . Microgrids, which are emerging as a promising alternative to traditional centralized power systems, mitigate the above problems through distributed energy generation close to the loads and the use of renewable energy sources [3] , [4] .
Microgrids are small-scale power supply networks that are designed to supply electric power to small communities such as housing complexes, universities, schools, industrial estates etc. [4] . A microgrid consists of an interconnected network of several energy sources such as solar panels, wind power stations, fuel cells and microturbines, and electrical loads such as households and factories [4] . The energy sources, called microsources, are typically of smaller capacity than the large generators in traditional power systems and are located close to the loads [4] .
A microgrid is connected to the central power grid, called macrogrid, and to other microgrids in its vicinity, and can transfer power to or receive power from them. Now, there is often uncertainty in the amount of power generated by a given microsource in a microgrid and also in the amount of power consumed by a given load, e.g., the amount of power generated by a solar panel depends on the weather, and the amount of power consumed by a household depends on the electrical equipment that is being used-both of the above factors are uncertain. So, in a given time slot, the aggregate power generated by all the microsources within a microgrid may be more than, less than or equal to the aggregate power G. Kasbekar consumed by all the loads in the microgrid. Thus, in each slot, a microgrid generates more than, less than or as much aggregate power as it requires.
Electricity deficits in a microgrid must be compensated through electricity trades with the macrogrid and also with other microgrids. Note that trades among neighboring microgrids may incur lower costs than trades of the microgrids with the macrogrid due to elimination of electricity wastage during long distance transmission. In fact, the above trade may be viewed as a potential opportunity, and "the bigger promise of microgrids may be in the private sector, not as islands of power unto themselves, but as trading partners, making and sharing electricity with each other and the grid at large [15] ." Although significant progress has been made in the microgrid generation technology, electricity trades among microgrids have received limited attention [16] . The existing schemes are primarily centralized [17] and mostly auction-based (requiring a centralized auctioneer) [18] . Note that centralized schemes are not likely to scale as the technology proliferates. The penetration of this nascent technology is therefore contingent on the design of a distributed and scalable electricity trading framework equipped with dynamic pricing strategies that adapt to the load and price fluctuations of the macrogrid and all the microgrids. This design may not be accomplished adopting the macro-economics viewpoint that has been extensively used for analyzing traditional electricity markets (even those that consider renewable electricity generation) e.g., [19] , [20] , [21] . A macro-economic market consists of a very large number of buyers and sellers. Next, when the competition is perfect, the equilibrium price of the commodity to be traded equals the market-clearing price at which the aggregate demand and aggregate supply in the market match. Each individual seller acts as a price taker and sets his price equal to the market-clearing price. Some prior work employing the macroeconomics viewpoint also allow the individual prices to be determined so as to maximize a social utility e.g., [22] , or based on risk neutral pricing (which assumes arbitrary storage capabilities) e.g., [23] , [24] , [25] , [26] , [27] . Given that the microgrid technology is now growing (albeit rapidly as projected), starting from the stage that microgrids have only been experimentally deployed so far, a micro-economic analysis that considers a market with a small number of entities and allows the trade dynamics to depend on the choices of and the uncertainties experienced by the individual entities is imperative; the decisions in such a setting would likely be motivated from individual profit considerations rather than global objectives. This is the space where this paper seeks to contribute.
We consider the following mechanism for the trade of power among neighboring microgrids in a region and the macrogrid: at the beginning of every time slot, each microgrid that expects to have excess power in the slot announces a price at which it is willing to sell the power. The microgrids who expect to have deficit power then buy power from the microgrids with excess power who set the lowest prices (and from the macrogrid if the total amount of power required by the microgrids with deficit power is not available with the microgrids with excess power). This results in price competition among the microgrids with excess power. If a microgrid quotes a low price, it will attract buyers, but will earn lower profit per sale. This is a common feature of an oligopoly [1] , in which multiple firms sell a common good to a pool of buyers. Price competition in an oligopoly is naturally modeled using game theory [2] , and has been extensively studied in economics using, for example, the classic Bertrand game [1] , [8] and its variants.
However, a microgrid market has several distinguishing features, which makes the price competition very different from oligopolies encountered in economics. First, in every slot, each microgrid may have excess power, deficit power or neither. Thus, each microgrid who has excess power is uncertain about the number of microgrids from whom it will face competition as well as the demand for power. A low price will result in unnecessarily low revenues in the event that very few other microgrids have excess power or several microgrids have deficit power, because even with a higher price the microgrid's power would have been bought, and vice versa. Second, note that the sets of buyers and sellers in a microgrid market are drawn from the same pool of traders (the set of all the microgrids in the vicinity and the macrogrid), whereas in most traditional markets, the sets of buyers and sellers are distinct.
In this paper, we analyze price competition among interconnected microgrids in a region using the framework of game theory [2] and study Nash Equilibria (NE) [2] in the game. We model the system by assuming that in each slot, a microgrid may either have one unit of excess power, one unit of deficit power or may have neither excess nor deficit power, with some probabilities (Section II). First, in Section III, we consider the case where each microgrid has deficit power with the same probability, although the probability that a microgrid has excess power may be different for different microgrids. Since prices can take real values, the strategy sets of the microgrids are continuous. In addition, the utilities of the microgrids are not continuous functions of their actions. Thus, classical results, including those for concave and potential games, do not establish the existence and uniqueness of NE in the resulting game, and there is no standard algorithm for finding a NE. Nevertheless, we are able to explicitly compute a NE and show its uniqueness, allowing for player strategies that are arbitrary mixtures of continuous and discrete probability distributions. The structure of the NE reveals several interesting insights, which we discuss in Section III-C. Next, in Section IV, we consider the model analyzed in Section III with arbitrary deficit power probabilities of the microgrids and explicitly compute a NE for the case of three microgrids. We provide numerical studies in Section V and conclude in Section VI.
In the economics literature, the Bertrand game [1] , [8] and several of its variants have been used to study price competition. The closest to our work are [10] , [11] , which analyze price competition where each seller may be inactive with some probability. In our prior work [12] , [13] , we analyzed price competition among primary users in a Cognitive Radio Network-in that model, each primary may have unused bandwidth with some probability, which it can sell to a secondary user. However, [10] , [11] , [12] suffer from the limitation that they consider only the symmetric model where the good availability probability of each seller is the same 1 . Also, in all of the above papers [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , the set of sellers and the set of buyers are distinct, whereas in case of price competition among interconnected microgrids, the sellers and buyers are drawn from the same set of traders.
The facts that in the game we consider, (i) there is uncertainty in whether a given trader (microgrid) has the good (excess power) to sell in a slot and (ii) the sets of sellers and buyers are drawn from the same pool of traders result in significant changes in the structure of the NE in comparison with that in games where one or both of the above features are not present. For example, in the Bertrand price competition game [8] , which does not have features (i) and (ii), there is a unique NE, which is of pure strategy type [8] . On the other hand, in the game in this paper, no pure strategy NE exists and there is a unique NE, which is of mixed strategy type, provided there are at least three microgrids in the system. If there are two microgrids, there is a pure strategy NE in the game in this paper, but the NE strategies are different from those in the Bertrand game. Also, the NE in the game studied in [13] (see the preceding paragraph), which has feature (i) but not feature (ii) above, is of mixed-strategy type for the case of two sellers, and hence differs in structure from the game in this paper. Finally, in the game in this paper, for the case of three microgrids, when the probabilities of the microgrids having deficit power are asymmetric, the expected utilities that the microgrids get are also asymmetric, in contrast to the game in [13] , in which the expected utilities are always equal.
Due to space constraints, the proofs of all the analytical results are relegated to our technical report [14] .
II. MODEL
We consider a scenario in which there are n microgrids close to each other in a region. Each microgrid consists of an interconnected network of microsources (e.g., solar panels, fuel cells, wind power generators) and loads (e.g., households, factories, shops). Also, the n microgrids are connected to each other and each of the n microgrids is connected to the central grid or macrogrid.
In each microgrid, the microsources are capable of generating electrical power and each load has some demand for power. Time is divided into slots of equal duration. In each slot, there is uncertainty in the amount of power generated by a given microsource as well as the amount of power consumed by a given load. For example, the amount of power generated by a solar panel depends on the weather, and the amount of power consumed by a household depends on the weather, the time of the day, the electrical equipment that is being operated etc.-all of the above factors are uncertain. So in each slot, a given microgrid either generates more, less or as much aggregate power as it requires. To model this, we assume that in every slot, each microgrid i ∈ {1, . . . , n} independently has 1 unit of excess power with probability (w.p.) q i , 1 unit of deficit power w.p. s i and neither excess nor deficit w.p. 1 − q i − s i , where q i > 0, s i > 0 and q i + s i < 1. Also, we assume that each microgrid knows whether it will have excess power, deficit power or neither in a slot at the beginning of the slot.
Each microgrid is capable of drawing power from or transferring power to the macrogrid or another microgrid. Since microgrids as well as the macrogrid are selfish entities, the transfer of power by any of these entities is done in exchange for a fee. The macrogrid buys power from microgrids at the rate of c per unit and sells power to microgrids at the rate of v per unit, where we assume that c < v since the macrogrid incurs some cost for transmission and distribution of power over long distances and also makes some profit. We assume that c and v are constant and known to all the microgrids. Now, each microgrid that has 1 unit of excess power announces a price p i at which it is willing to sell power to a microgrid that has 1 unit of deficit power. Note that a microgrid with excess power always has the option of selling its power to the macrogrid for a price of c; so p i ≥ c. Similarly, a microgrid with deficit power has the option of buying power from the macrogrid for a price of v;
Let N (respectively, K) be the number of microgrids with excess power (respectively, deficit power) in a slot. If K ≤ N , then the microgrids that have deficit power buy power from the microgrids offering the K lowest prices among those who have excess power. If K > N, then N of the microgrids with deficit power buy power from the microgrids with excess power and the remaining K − N buy power from the macrogrid.
If microgrid j sets 2 a price p j , j = 1, . . . , n, and microgrid i has 1 unit of excess power, we define the utility u i (p 1 , . . . , p n ) of microgrid i to be the incremental revenue that it earns over and above its revenue if it were to sell its power to the macrogrid; so u i (p 1 , . . . , p n ) = p i − c if microgrid i sells its power to another microgrid at price p i , and u i (p 1 , . . . , p n ) = 0 if microgrid i sells its power to the macrogrid for price c.
We allow each microgrid i to choose its price p i randomly from a set of prices using an arbitrary distribution function 3 
, which is referred to as the strategy of microgrid i. The vector (ψ 1 (.), . . . , ψ n (.)) of strategies of the microgrids is called a strategy profile [1] . Let
. . , ψ n (.)) denote the vector of strategies of the microgrids other than i. Let E{u i (ψ i (.), ψ −i )} denote the expected utility of microgrid i when it adopts strategy ψ i (.) and the other microgrids adopt ψ −i . If the strategy ψ i (.) consists of setting the single price p i w.p. 1, then we also denote the above expected utility by
We use the Nash Equilibrium (NE) solution concept, which has been extensively used in game theory as a prediction of the outcome of a game. A NE is a strategy profile such that no player can improve his expected utility by unilaterally deviating from his strategy [1] . Thus, in our context, (ψ *
When players other than i play ψ * −i , ψ * i (.) maximizes i's expected utility and is thus its best-response [1] to ψ −i . Our goal is to find NE in the above price competition game and to investigate its uniqueness. Now, if n = 2, then there are only two microgrids, say 1 and 2. There is no price competition between them, since in no event are they simultaneously prospective sellers to a common set of buyer microgrids, and it is easy to check that the strategy profile in which both microgrids i = 1, 2 set the price p i = v w.p. 1 is the unique NE. So henceforth, we assume that n ≥ 3.
III. SYMMETRIC DEFICIT POWER PROBABILITIES
For tractability, in the rest of this section, we assume that s 1 = . . . = s n = s for some s ∈ (0, 1). Note that q 1 , . . . , q n need not be equal. In Section IV, we analyze the generalization where s 1 , . . . , s n may be unequal (and q 1 , . . . , q n may also be unequal) for the case n = 3.
Without loss of generality, we assume that q 1 , . . . , q n satisfy:
For convenience, we define the pseudo-price of microgrid i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, p i , as the price it selects if it has excess power and
Thus, ψ i (.) and φ i (.) differ only by a constant factor on [c, v] and we use them interchangeably wherever applicable.
In Section III-A, we state some necessary conditions that any profile of NE strategies must satisfy. In Section III-B, we note that these conditions are sufficient and also explicitly compute the NE and show its uniqueness. In Section III-C, we discuss the insights that the structure of this NE provides.
A. Necessary Conditions for a NE
Consider a NE under which the d.f. of the price (respectively, pseudo-price) of microgrid i is ψ i (.) (respectively, φ i (.)). In Theorem 1 below, we show that the NE strategies must have a particular structure. Before stating Theorem 1, we describe some basic properties of the NE strategies. Thus, there does not exist a pure strategy NE (one in which every microgrid selects a single price with probability (w.p.) 1). Now, let u i,max be the expected payoff that microgrid i gets in the NE and L i be the lower endpoint of the support set 6 of ψ i (.), i.e.:
Definition 1: Let N −i (respectively, K −i ) be the number of microgrids out of microgrids {1, . . . , n}\i who have 1 unit of excess power (respectively, deficit power). Also, let
Property 2:
Also,
Thus, the lower endpoints of the support sets of the d.f.s ψ 1 (.), . . . , ψ n (.) of all the microgrids are the same and they get the same expected payoff in the NE.
Theorem 1: The following are necessary conditions for strategies φ 1 (.), . . . , φ n (.) to constitute a NE: 1) φ 1 (.), . . . , φ n (.) satisfy Property 1 and Property 2.
2) There exist numbers R j , j = 1, . . . , n + 1, and a function
and φ j (R j ) = q j , j = 1, . . . , n.
Also, every point in [p, R j ) is a best response for microgrid j and it plays every sub-interval in [p, R j ) with positive probability. Finally, R 1 = R 2 = v. Theorem 1 says that all n microgrids play prices in the range [p, R n ), the d.f. φ n (.) of microgrid n stops increasing at R n , the remaining microgrids 1, . . . , n − 1 also play prices in the range [R n , R n−1 ), the d.f. φ n−1 (.) of microgrid n − 1 stops increasing at R n−1 , and so on. Also, microgrid 1's d.f. φ 1 (.) has a jump of height q 1 − q 2 at v if q 1 > q 2 . Fig. 1 illustrates the structure.
B. Explicit Computation, Uniqueness and Sufficiency
By Theorem 1, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}:
So the candidate NE strategies φ 1 (.), . . . , φ n (.) are completely determined oncep, R 1 , . . . , R n and the function φ(.) are specified. Also, Property 2 provides the value ofp, and R 1 = R 2 = v by Theorem 1. First, we will show that there also exist unique R 3 , . . . , R n and φ(.) satisfying (5), (6) , and (7) and will compute them. Then, we will show that the resulting strategies given by (8) indeed constitute a NE (sufficiency). Definition 2: Let p −i be the K −i 'th smallest pseudo-price out of the pseudo-prices, {p l : l ∈ {1, . . . , n}, l = i}, of the 6 The support set of a d.f. is the smallest closed set such that its complement has probability zero under the d.f. [5] . 
microgrids other than i (with p
Since K −1 microgrids out of microgrids 2, . . . , n have deficit power, if microgrid 1 has excess power and sets p 1 = x ∈ [p, v), its power is bought iff 7 p −1 > x, which happens w.p. 1 − F −1 (x). Note that microgrid 1's payoff is (x − c) if its power is bought and 0 otherwise. So, letting E{u i (x, ψ −i )} denote the expected payoff of microgrid i if it sets a price x and the other microgrids use the strategy profile ψ −i , we have that for x ∈ [p, v):
where the second equality follows from the facts that each x ∈ [p, v) is a best response for microgrid 1 by Theorem 1, and u 1,max = (p− c) 1 − (1 − s) n−1 by (4). By (9), we get:
where,
Next, we calculate R i , i = 3, . . . , n and φ(.) using (10).
1) Computation of R i , i = 3, . . . , n:
Consider n− 1 events, each of which has three possible outcomes-deficit, success and failure. Each event results in deficit w.p. s. Let K −1 be the total number of events that result in deficit 8 . For 0 ≤ y ≤ 1, let f i (y) be the probability of K −1 or more successes out of the n−1 events if i−1 of them have success probability y and the remaining n − i have success probabilities q i+1 , . . . , q n . An expression for f i (.) can be easily computed. Now, to compute R i , i ∈ {3, . . . , n}, we note that by (8) and (5), φ j (R i ) = q i , j = 2, . . . , i, and φ j (R i ) = q j , j = i + 1, . . . , n. Also, we define the n − 1 events in the preceding paragraph as follows: for j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let the j'th event result in deficit if the j'th microgrid has 1 unit of deficit power, in success if {p j ≤ R i } and in failure otherwise. Then by the definition of F −1 (.), we get:
By (10) and (12):
By (11) and (13), R i is unique and is given by:
2) Computation of φ(.): Now we compute the function {φ(.) : x ∈ [p, v)} by separately computing it for each interval (8) and (5):
and
We define the n − 1 events in the definition of the function f i (.) as follows: for j ∈ {2, . . . , n}, let the j'th event result in deficit if the j'th microgrid has 1 unit of deficit power, in success if {p j ≤ x} and in failure otherwise. By definition of F −1 (x) and using P {p j ≤ x} = φ j (x), (15) and (16):
By (10) and (17):
Lemma 1: For each x, (18) has a unique solution φ(x). The function φ(.) is strictly increasing and continuous on [p, v).
Thus, there is a unique function φ(.), and by (8) , unique φ i (.), i = 1, . . . , n that satisfy the conditions in Theorem 1.
3) Sufficiency:
. . , n given by (14) , and φ(.) being the solution of (18), constitute the unique NE. The corresponding price d.f.s are
C. Discussion
The structure of the unique NE identified in Theorems 1 and 2 provides several interesting insights: 1) First, by Property 1, ψ 1 (.) has a jump at v iff q 1 > q 2 and is continuous everywhere else, whereas ψ 2 (.), . . . , ψ n (.) are always continuous on [c, v] . Thus, each microgrid randomizes over a range of prices. This random selection of prices can be interpreted as follows: each microgrid i that has excess power sets a base price v and randomly holds "sales" to attract the microgrids that have deficit power by lowering the price to some value p i < v 9 . 2) Second, from (1), (5) and the fact that the support set of ψ i (.) is [p, R i ], it follows that only the microgrids with a high excess power availability probability (q) play high prices (see Fig. 1 ). Intuitively this is because all the microgrids play low prices (nearp), so if a microgrid sets a high price, it is undercut by all the other microgrids. But a microgrid with a high q runs a lower risk of being undercut than one with a low q because of the lower excess power availability probabilities of the set of microgrids other than itself.
3) Third, note that there does not exist a pure strategy NE, and the unique NE is of mixed-strategy type. We contrast this with the Bertrand price competition game [8] , in which (i) there are n sellers, each of whom owns 1 unit of a good w.p. utility u i (p 1 , . . . , p n ) of seller i if seller j sets a price p j , j = 1, . . . , n, is p i − c if seller i's good is bought and 0 otherwise. Note that the game in our paper differs from the Bertrand game in that there is uncertainty in the availability of the goods with the sellers, and the sets of buyers and sellers are drawn from a common pool of traders. In the Bertrand game, the pure strategy profile under which each seller deterministically selects c as his price is the unique NE [8] . This strategy profile is not a NE in our context as it provides 0 utility for each microgrid, whereas by quoting any price above c (and below v), each microgrid with excess power can attain a positive expected utility since it will sell its power at least in the event that it is the only microgrid with excess power and at least one microgrid has deficit power, which happens with positive probability. Thus, uncertainty in the availability of goods with the sellers and the drawing of the sets of buyers and sellers from a common pool of traders fundamentally alters the structure of the NE. 4) Finally, we compare the NE found in this section with that in the game studied in [13] , which is like the Bertrand game described in 3) above, with the difference that each seller i ∈ {1, . . . , n} owns 1 unit of the good w.p. q i ∈ (0, 1) (instead of w.p. 1) and 0 units w.p. 1 − q i . Note that in the game studied in this section as well as in the game in [13] , there is uncertainty in the availability of the goods with the sellers. However, the difference between the two games is that in the former, the sets of buyers and sellers are drawn from the same pool of traders, whereas in the latter, the sets of buyers and sellers are distinct. Recall that in the former game, (i) for the case n = 2, as noted at the end of Section II, the strategy profile in which both microgrids i = 1, 2 set the price p i = v w.p. 1 is the unique NE and (ii) for the case n ≥ 3, the structure of the unique NE is as in Theorems 1 and 2. However, in the latter game, the structure of the NE for n ≥ 3 as well as for n = 2 is similar to the structure in Theorems 1 and 2 [13] .
IV. ASYMMETRIC DEFICIT POWER PROBABILITIES In Section III, we assumed that s 1 = . . . = s n = s for some s ∈ (0, 1). In this section, we relax that assumption and allow s 1 , . . . , s n to be unequal. This makes the analysis significantly harder. So for tractability, we consider only the case n = 3 and find a NE.
In this section, we do not assume that (1) holds, but instead, consider a generalization of that condition. Consider the quantity
. Without loss of generality, assume that i = 3 maximizes it, i.e.:
1
Also, suppose:
Note that the conditions in (19) and (20) together generalize condition (1), and they reduce to (1) when
In the sequel, we will present a strategy profile that is a NE when (19) and (20) hold. When (20) does not hold, then the strategy profile obtained by swapping the roles of microgrids 1 and 2 everywhere in the above strategy profile is a NE.
A. The NE Let p i be the price selected by microgrid i and let the corresponding pseudo-price p i be as defined in Section III. Also, as before, let ψ i (.) and φ i (.) be the d.f. of p i and p i respectively. Let L i (respectively, R i ) be the left (respectively, right) endpoint of the support set of ψ i (.).
We will now describe the NE strategies. Let
It is easy to check that c <p < v. We will later see that in the NE,
where:
Theorem 3: The strategies ψ 1 (.), ψ 2 (.) and ψ 3 (.) in (24), (25) and (26) constitute a NE.
B. Discussion
It can be checked that when s 1 = s 2 = s 3 = s, the NE strategies in (24) , (25) and (26) reduce to those computed in Section III.
We now compare the structure of the NE given by (24) , (25) and (26) with that in Theorem 1. First, note that by (24) , (25) and (26), for x in the range [p, R 3 ), each of ψ 1 (x), ψ 2 (x) and ψ 3 (x) equals F (x) times a constant factor (i.e., a factor that does not depend on x), and hence they differ only by a constant multiplicative factor. This is similar to the NE strategies in Theorem 1 (with n = 3), for which, by (6) and the fact that φ i (x) = q i ψ i (x), each of ψ 1 (x), ψ 2 (x) and ψ 3 (x) equals φ(x) times a constant factor on x ∈ [p, R 3 ). However, a difference is that for the NE strategies in Theorem 1, for x in the range [R 3 , v), ψ 1 (.) and ψ 2 (.) differ only by a constant multiplicative factor, whereas this is not the case in general for the NE in (24) , (25) and (26) . Thus, a structure similar to that in (6) does not hold in general for the NE in (24), (25) and (26) .
Property 1 generalizes to the NE in (24), (25) and (26) (20) holds with equality and has a jump at v otherwise, whose size can be obtained from (24) . Property 2 generalizes to give the following. L 1 = . . . = L n =p, wherep is given by (21) . Also, the expected payoffs of the microgrids in the NE are given by:
Note that when s 1 = s 2 = s 3 , by Property 2, the expected payoffs of the three microgrids in the NE are equal. Also, recall that in point 4 in the discussion in Section III-C, we noted that the structure of the unique NE in the game studied in [13] is similar to that in Theorems 1 and 2; it also turns out that the expected payoffs of all the sellers in that NE are equal [13] . However, for the NE in (24), (25) and (26), the expected payoffs of the three microgrids are not equal in general, as can be seen from (27), (28) and (29). This is an interesting idiosyncrasy brought about by the inequity among s 1 , s 2 and s 3 .
V. NUMERICAL STUDIES
In this section, using numerical experiments, we compare the trade of power among interconnected microgrids proposed in this paper with a scheme in which microgrids only trade power with the macrogrid, and also further study the NE studied in Sections III and IV. Throughout, we use the parameter values c = 0 and v = 1.
First, we consider q 1 , . . . , q n that are uniformly spaced in [q L , q H ] for some parameters q L and q H , and
be the mean probability of having excess power of the microgrids. We consider two schemes: (i) the scheme considered in this paper; and (ii) a centralized scheme in which a microgrid who has deficit power (respectively, excess power) in a slot buys power from (respectively, sells power to) the macrogrid alone. Recall that in scheme (i), a microgrid with excess power sells power to a microgrid with deficit power for a price in [c, v] , whereas the macrogrid buys power at price c and sells power at price v; thus, the microgrids trade power among themselves whenever possible, and with the macrogrid only in the event of necessity arising from a mismatch between the amounts of deficit and excess power with the microgrids. Let T D and T C be the total expected power traded (bought or sold) by all the microgrids with the macrogrid in one slot in schemes (i) and (ii) respectively. Note that since the microgrids are close to each other, power that is traded by the microgrids with the macrogrid is typically transmitted over longer distances than the power that is traded among the microgrids, resulting in larger transmission losses. Fig 2 plots T D , T C and the ratio η = TD TC versus q, and shows that scheme (i) results in considerable savings in the total expected power exchanged with the macrogrid over scheme (ii) (the savings are between 43.4% and 68.4% in the current example). Also, note that T D achieves its lowest value around q = 0.25, which is close to the value of s (0.3). This is consistent with the intuition that when the mean excess power and deficit power probabilities of the microgrids are close to each other, the average total excess power available with the microgrids with excess power roughly matches the average total deficit power required by the microgrids with deficit power, and hence only a small amount of power needs to be exchanged with the macrogrid. Thus, trade of power among interconnected microgrids can result in substantial savings in the amount of power that needs to be transmitted over large distances, especially when the average excess power and deficit power probabilities of the microgrids are close to each other. Fig. 3 shows the price selection d.f.s of the microgrids in the NE for these parameter values. Their structure is as found in Section IV (see (24) , (25) and (26)) withp = 0.54, R 1 = R 2 = 1 and R 3 = 0.92. In particular, microgrid 1's price selection d.f. has a jump at v. The two plots in Fig. 3 shows that the price selection d.f.s in the NE with symmetric and asymmetric deficit power probabilities are qualitatively similar. be the mean probability of having excess power of the microgrids. Fig. 4 plots the mean price of excess power quoted by microgrid 1 in the NE found in Section III versus q. The figure shows that the mean price is decreasing in q; this is because, since s is constant, as q increases, the expected supply of power in the market increases relative to the expected demand for power and the price competition among the microgrids with excess power becomes more intense, driving down the prices. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We analyzed price competition among interconnected microgrids and found NE in the corresponding game. The analysis provides several insights-for example, there is randomization in the selection of prices by the microgrids who have excess power and, when the probabilities of having deficit power are symmetric, only microgrids with a high excess power availability probability set high prices. Numerical experiments showed that trade of power among interconnected microgrids results in significant savings in the total expected power transmitted over long distances and hence the transmission losses.
We noted that explicit computation and an investigation of the uniqueness of the NE is complicated when the deficit power probabilities of the microgrids are asymmetric; in this paper, we have computed a NE for the case n = 3. A direction for future work is to compute the NE and to investigate its uniqueness for arbitrary n. In addition, in each slot, the power corresponding to the outcome of the trade among the microgrids needs to be physically exchanged among the microgrids and in practice, several technical issues such as the connectivity among the microgrids, capacities of the transmission lines, meshed-grid loop-flow effects etc. would constrain this exchange. Another direction for future work is to extend our model by incorporating these technical issues as well as the measures that would ensure system protection during the exchange of this power.
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